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by the Moderator, Virginia Weldon

The Center for the Study of American Business welcomes all
of you this afternoon to what we believe will be an interesting debate on the role of federal regulation and how it affects our freemarket economy. We are probably past the point of a debate about
being for or against regulation. We're really down to, "How much
regulation?" and "How do we make it work in a reasonable way?"
Our two debaters bring decidedly different perspectives to this
issue, but who knows what the outcome will be-they may even
agree on some substantive suggestions that might lead to major
public policy reforms. We'll see.
First, let me introduce our visitor. Carol Tucker Foreman of
W:tshington, D.C. is no stranger to Washington University. Shereceived her degree in political science from Washington University
and has served as a member of its Board of Trustees. In 1978, she
received the Washington University Distinguished Alumni Award.
From 1973 to 1977, Carol was executive director of the Consumer
Federation of America, where she became a lead spokesperson for
consumers on food issues. From 1977 to 1981, she served as assistant secretary of agriculture for food and consumer services and
became the lead administration advocate for consumers on food
issues. She led the development of the first dietary guidelines for
Americans, and strengthened the Women's, Infant, and Children's
Supplemental Feeding Program known as WIC. In 1981, she formed
her own consulting firm and has been president of Foreman
Heidepriem & Mager Inc. until last month, when she left the firm
to rejoin the Consumer Federation of America as distinguished
fellow and director of CFA's new Food Policy Institute. It's a great
pleasure to welcome Carol back to her alma mater.
Murray Weidenbaum almost needs no introduction to this
audience. He is the Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor of Economics and founder and chairman of the Center for the
Study of American Business. In 1981-82, he served as chairman of
the Council of Economic Advisers to President Ronald Reagan. He
also was a member of the President's Economic Policy Advisory Board
from 1982 to 1989. He served as assistant secretary of the treasury
for economic policy to President Richard Nixon. Earlier in his career he was chief economist for Boeing. Constantly on the go, and a
prolific contributor to journals and writer of op-ed pieces, Murray
has recently been appointed to the bipartisan Trade Deficit Review
Commission at the recommendation of Senator Trent Lott and was
also the project director for the Committee for Economic
1

Development's report entitled, "Modernizing Government Regulation: The Need for Action."
So now you know a bit about our two debaters; let's get on with
it. Here are the ground rules. Each will have a maximum of 10
minutes for opening comments, followed by five minutes each for
rebuttal. We'll decide who will go first by a coin toss. Following their
opening comments and rebuttals, the two debaters will have an
opportunity to question each other and to take questions from the
audience. Each response will be limited to two minutes. Each debater will be allowed five minutes for summation, and then I will
try to determine if there are any common threads that might lead
to substantive recommendations for regulatory reform.
[Foreman won the coin toss and opted to follow Weidenbaum.]

Opening Comments
Weidenbaum: To put it simply but accurately, business and
government need each other. Without government there is anarchy. Without private enterprise there is poverty. However, the relationship between these two basic components of a modern society
is usually uneasy, and often adversarial.
The range of interaction between business and government
is complex. The same government that is the unfriendly regulator
and tax collector is also the most welcome customer and provider of
subsidy and credit. The relationship between business and government is uneven. The largest company cannot raise taxes or throw
you in jail. The smallest unit of government can.
A central issue facing any modern society is how to deal constructively with the dynamic tension between the public sector and
the private sector. Government sets the rules that are so essential
for a private enterprise system-enforcing private property rights
and business contracts-and establishing money itself.
In turn, business creates the jobs, income, and goods and services that are at the heart of the economy and that generate the
revenues to finance government. The competitive forces in the
marketplace are key to a free society. It is a remarkable uniformity of history that no collectivized economy has ever produced a
single free election or a free press.
The continuing challenge is how to constructively harness
the innovative power and motivating incentive of the business
enterprise so that it meets society's needs without weakening
business's unique characteristics that are at the heart of a free
society. That is a difficult task under the best of circumstances.
2

Given the emotional nature of most debates on business-government relations, we should try to raise the information level, not
the decibel level.
To get the discussion going, I offer a set of questions. They
may seem to be loaded questions-and they are. My purpose is to
get the policy debate to deal with real and tough issues.
1. Should the government regulate everything? The scope of regulation is constantly expanding. The rationale for compulsory helmet laws for motorcyclists could extend to controlling the diets of
badly overweight people. Both impose heavy medical costs on society. That is the reasoning in support of helmet laws.
2. Haven't we exceeded the limits ofsensible regulation? For example, smelly old clunkers represent the bulk of the pollution generated by autos. Yet public policy requires making new cars even
more expensive, encouraging people to hold on to those clunkers
longer. Worse yet, the much lighter cars that meet energy efficiency standards are far less safe to drive.

The relationship between business and government is
uneven. The largest company cannot raise taxes or
throw you in jail. The smallest unit ofgovernment can.
-Weidenbaum

Perhaps the biggest problem is that Congress does not know
how to legislate common sense on the part of the regulatory agencies.
• EPA's air standards assume an individual lives 218.7
yards from the source of air pollution and never leaves
the spot. She stays outdoors for 70 consecutive years without ever going indoors.
• EPA's water pollution standards assume an individual
drinks 2.1 quarts of contaminated water every day for 70
consecutive years.
• The regulators are in the process of requiring every bank
to report to the government any time an individual varies from his or her "normal" banking habits. That's really
scary. It could cover every graduating senior who gets a
full-time job.
3

3. Does it make sense for regulation to focus almost exclusively
on business? OSHA-the workplace regulator that is business's favorite four-letter word-places no responsibility on employees-even
when their actions endanger other employees. Important EPA laws
exempt government agencies and nonprofit institutions, no matter how much they pollute. Federal highway safety legislation regulates car manufacturing in excruciating detail. But the Feds ignore
the role of drunk drivers and drunk pedestrians-even though they
account for most highway fatalities. It is easier to regulate business than to deal with the problems directly.
4. Reforming regulation isn't necessarily a trade-offbetween dollars and lives. The most current example is the compulsory air bag.
It kills children and small women. Supposedly, the air bags save
large adults-but only if they don't already buckle up. Yet the critics of regulation get lambasted for supposedly caring more for dollars than for people.
What's the answer? We need to reconcile economic concerns
Uobs, competitiveness, and profits) with social concerns (environment, health, and safety). Policymakers keep them in separate
compartments, but shouldn't. For example, many federal tax and
expenditure subsidies supposedly help some sector of the economy,
but they mess up the environment. In turn, the typical environmental statute prohibits taking account of economic factors and
thus it may take the least efficient and most costly approach in
reaching its objectives.
Foreman: In a complex, technologically advanced society, government establishes the rules needed to protect public health and
safety, assure fair markets and promote the general welfare.
In our representative democracy, the rules evolve from a constant tugging and shoving and balancing of competing interests
and conflicting values. Economic efficiency is one of those values.
Market mechanisms have served our nation very well, and Americans have a justifiable fondness for them. But surely the founding
fathers were stirred by a vision of something more than generating the greatest output for the least input and, from the beginning
of the nation, Americans have consistently put basic social values
including equity, safety, and public health above the market. The
regulatory process is one of the tools we have developed to allow us
to enjoy the benefits of market capitalism while managing the
undesirable consequences of the single-minded pursuit of profit.
Critics of federal regulation charge that too often rules are
constructed by legislators and regulators who are oblivious to market necessity and too beholden to a fickle electorate. And the rules
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themselves impose irrational, unreasonable burdens on business.
There are three serious weaknesses in that argument.
First, as one who has labored as a lobbyist for many years,
getting a bill through Congress and signed by the president is no
easy task. It requires massing enough data and public support to
overcome the many institutional barriers to action. Many would
argue that, in fact, our system of checks and balances causes the
U.S. government to be too slow in addressing the problems generated by a technologically sophisticated world.
Second, far from being disadvantaged by the decision-making
process in Washington, corporate America, with its lobbying budgets and campaign contributions, has the tools and the access to
influence government decision making.
Third, examine the range of federal regulation. You will find
that American business spends much of that influence seeking
not to reduce federal regulation, but to maintain and even increase it.

Surely the founding fathers were stirred by a vision of
something more than generating the greatest output for
the least input, and Americans have consistently put
basic social values ... above the market.
-Foreman

Let me note a few examples. New Deal-era economic regulation provided a nice, comfortable, competition-free ni~he for truckers, airlines, and railroads. They held on to the1r regulatory
protection long after there was much public v~lue to t~e rate- ~d
route-setting of the ICC and the CAB. Econom1c regulat10n restncting markets still thrives. Banks have spent mi.l lions .of dollars lobbying to keep securities companies out of the1r bus1ness. Peanut,
sugar, and dairy farmers fight fiercely to keep government regulators allocating markets and setting prices for their products.
Today, the debate centers on social, not economic, regulation.
Economists conservative commentators, and think tank leaders
argue that 'health, environmental, and civil rights regulation is
strangling the market and must be pared back. Fortunately, the
markets just keep ignoring their dire predictions. We meet here
one day after the Dow reached a rather important milestone.
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The argument that regulation throttles growth is further undermined by the constant efforts of business leaders to stay under
the yoke of federal control.
For example, to assure that meat and poultry labels are accurate, USDA regulations require a company representative to appear at the Department to have the label examined and approved.
Vice President Gore's "reinventing government" project suggested
ending the practice and cutting back on the rigid control over labels. Consumer advocates didn't object, but some regulated companies did. They feared their competitors would cheat. And companies
that sell label "expediting" services to the industry not only objected,
they got a court injunction to prevent the change.
If the Food and Drug Administration didn't exist, food companies would be forced to invent it. Without FDA's assurance of its
safety, cheese and yogurt makers would never have bought milk
from cows treated with Monsanto's recombinant bovine growth
hormone.
The primary legislative goal of the Grocery Manufacturers of
America this year is to expand the reach of federal regulation. The
GMA wants Congress to expand federal authority over the food industry, to pre-empt state action regulating food safety and labeling.
Does that surprise you? It shouldn't. Business frequently prefers
federal regulation to state because, in the pithy words of one trade
association executive, "I'd rather be regulated by one federal gorilla than fifty state monkeys."
The inconsistency of the anti-regulation forces doesn't stop
there. Leading opponents of regulation, including some running
for president of the U.S., want federal regulators out of the boardroom, but favor moving them into our bedrooms. They want federal
regulations to govern medical decisions between a woman and her
doctor about whether to end a pregnancy, and to limit sexual practices between consenting adults. Does anyone think a cost-benefit
analysis would contribute anything worthwhile to those debates?
Business leaders and social conservatives decry federal regulation
in theory, but drink from the cup of federal power when it is convenient to do so.
It's almost impossible to find anyone who is unabashedly progovernment regulation. Most of us are ambivalent about it at best.
We'd like to get rid of the regulations that protect the other guy and
keep the ones that protect our own interests. As one wise participant in the process once stated, "When it comes to regulation, where
you stand depends upon where you sit."
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Rebuttals
Weidenbaum: Thank you. That was very interesting, because
Carol is often right and often wrong. Let me disentangle that.
She's absolutely right-Congress devotes a lot of time and
energy before it passes a law to try to make sure that there's
really a compelling need for it. But examine that Congressional
process carefully. Overwhelmingly, maybe 80-90 percent of the
time and effort is devoted to hearings on the nature of the problem. The solution, the actual law establishing the regulatory
regime, gets rushed through with very little attention from the
Congress. Typically the staff is still preparing it when the Congress votes the bill. That staggers the imagination, but it's true.
A copy of the Clean Air Act, for example, wasn't available to the
members of the Congress when they had to vote yes or no on it. And
I don't mean to pick on that-the same is true with every major tax
bill. But it helps explain the shortcomings of the actuality of
government.

I don't think that the proper, sensible, desirable way of
looking at government regulation is from a viewpoint
of government or of business .... The proper way is to
look at the whole phenomenon of government, and
especially government regulation, from the viewpoint
ofthe consumer. -Weidenbaum

Yes, Carol is right-many businesses get so used to regulation that they use it to keep out new competition. Exactly! That's
one of the shortcomings that economists constantly cite as a key
reason for reducing the array of government regulation. That's not
an excuse to keep the regulation.
But there is a red herring I really want to object to. Whatever
your view of government in the bedroom is-and I have a hunch
that Carol and I are rather close on that one-thaes irrelevant to
the subject of government regulation of business. If it's not a red
herring, it's like my shirt, blushing pink.
I don't think that the proper, sensible, desirable way of looking
at government regulation is from a viewpoint of government or of
business. In a sense both are middlemen or middlewomen. The
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proper way is to look at the whole phenomenon of government, and
especially government regulation, from the viewpoint of the consumer.
And here the consumer bears the burden of government regulation in terms of higher costs, reduced variety of products, as well as
getting whatever benefits there are from government regulation.
But that's the proper way of looking at it: "Is the consumer
better off or worse off from a given government regulation?" Not:
"Do you care about clean air? Do you care about a safe workplace?" We all do. The difficult question-that's why I raised some
of those loaded questions earlier-the real serious concern is,
on balance, is this specific government intervention you're talking about helpful or hurtful to the average citizen, to the average taxpayer? That's the question that is avoided in most of the
debates, unfortunately, and avoided on both sides. Even if it's a
boon to business, if it's a bane to the consumer, we ought to
oppose it. Not that we oppose clean air or clean water, but we
oppose the specific bureaucratic intervention, in a sense saying to the Congress and to the regulators, "Back to the showers.
This doesn't hack it. Take another stab at it."
And let me say finally, there's a limit to the amount of activity
that government can sensibly perform. You take a look at the thousands of pages-the library-that is filled by all of the statutes and
regulations issued by government. Common sense tells you that
even if the government were staffed by Newtons and Einsteins,
they couldn't sensibly carry out that whole array. To get down to it,
there's a case for economizing-not eliminating-economizing on
government regulation.
Weldon: Carol?
Foreman: Thank you. My friend Murray argues in his recent essay on regulatory reform that regulation impairs economic growth. On the way out here this morning, I remembered
that Missourians kind of like newspapers as props. I couldn't
find the Harry Truman Chicago Tribune, but I thought maybe I'd
bring this morning's Wall Street Journal. It proclaims that yesterday the Dow passed 10,000 for the first time in history.
Government regulation has frequently stimulated innovation
and the development of new products. Until recently, the Department of Agriculture argued that it didn't have the authority to regulate the presence of pathogens in raw meat and poultry. The result:
There were no tests for discovering the presence of those pathogens. In the couple of years since the Department began to regulate them, there's been an enormous amount of technology transfer
and a whole raft of new tests to detect the existence of these patho-
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gens and improve public health protection.
I think it is wonderful Murray is in his "on the one hand, ... on
the other hand" mode today. On the one hand he argues that
government's gone too far in regulating individual behavior, for
example the helmet laws. But then he suggests that perhaps it
would be more appropriate to take the burden of highway safety off
of the automobile manufacturers and put more of it onto the drunk
drivers and drunk pedestrians who are responsible for most of the
traffic fatalities. I'm not sure where he goes on that. One of the
reasons, incidentally, that the federal government does regulate
highway safety and ignores the problem of drunk driving and drunk
pedestrians is that the states regulate those areas. It hasn't been
determined to be interstate commerce. Last year, however, in the
Congress, there was an effort to try to influence the states and get
them to be a little more vigilant about drunk drivers by attaching
strings on the highway trust fund and encouraging states to lower
the blood alcohol that qualified you as being under the influence. It
went down to defeat because the alcohol industry and conservatives in the Congress argued that this would be an inappropriate
new expansion of federal regulatory power.

Government regulation has frequently stimulated
innovation and the development of new products.
-Foreman

The banking regulation that Murray mentioned is an interesting one. It was proposed, but withdrawn. It was not the idea of
social regulation advocates but of conservatives, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
They wanted the banks to keep these records in order to help keep
tabs on organized crime and drug dealers.
The most important difference between Murray and me-and
it's one that I'll come back to in my recommendations-is determining when something is the fault of regulators and when it is
because a law has been badly drafted by the Congress. Murray made
reference to that in his comments on the EPA and the tax laws. But
it's not often that critics of regulation are as precise as he was in
making that criticism. In his recent paper, Murray criticizes the
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Department of Agriculture for continuing to look at every one of the
4 billion chickens that are slaughtered each year. It is a silly thing.
But it continues because the meat industry does not support changing the archaic law that requires it.

Questions from the Floor
Weldon: Thanks, Carol. Well, you've heard from our two debaters now, and you've heard their rebuttals. There will now be an
opportunity to take questions from the audience directed to one or
both. Each will have approximately two minutes to respond to your
questions. The two debaters can also question each other, and I have
a few questions in case we don't have enough from the audience.
Question 1: Dwight Lee, adjunct fellow with the Center for the Study
of American Business. I would argue that business often fights for
regulation, but what they're really doing is fighting against the most
effective type of regulation. It seems to me many of the business
attempts to get regulated, as you pointed out, are attempts to protect themselves against competition and the forces of the market,
which I think provides much more effective regulation in many
cases than many of the regulatory advocates think or believe, and
businesses are trying to get out from under that regulation by getting tariffs or getting other forms of regulation like the CAB-trucking-to eliminate or reduce the competition.
Foreman: Clearly businesses go for economic regulation in
order to protect themselves against the weaknesses of the market.
A vigorous antitrust regulatory system, in my view, is the best way
to go after that problem. Sometimes it requires weaning businesses
that have been dependent upon federal regulation for a long time.
One of the reasons that I oppose the regulatory budget is that it
says, "This is the amount of money that we'll have for regulation"
and makes no effort to differentiate between the billion dollars a
year cost of looking at every fool chicken slaughtered and another
regulation that could pass anybody's test for preserving life and
health in a modern society.
Weidenbaum: I'd like to point out that, with an awful lot of
regulation, the statute initially is enacted over the objection of
business. But of course business adheres to it once it becomes
law-learns to live with it, and then, yes, often becomes an enthusiastic defender of the regulation to keep out new competition.
That's just the normal process of adjusting to some dumb law that
shouldn't have been enacted in the first place.
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Question 2: Leonard Guarria, World Agricultural Forum. You've correctly noted that regulation and business have a special relationship. But it's much more complex, it would seem to me now,
in the international arena. Regulation is often proposed by governments against other governments or their industries. I'd like
to hear your views on regulation in an international sense.
Weidenbaum: It's always difficult to generalize in such an
array of regulation, but so much of the current emphasis on
international regulation is designed, as I can see it, to be a
trade barrier, to protect. An example: The European Union is
using regulation in lieu of tariffs. Tariff increases will run afoul
of the World Trade Organization agreement, so therefore they
are using a second-best alternative, health and safety regulations, although it seems clear the concern isn't health or sa~ety
but the financial health of the producers in the European Union.
And the health and safety regulations are in effect a loophole
used to restrict international commerce. I think that's a very
undesirable development. In fact, if we went back to the early
regime when we had tariffs, it wouldn't be as bad because tariffs
operate through the price system. You cut costs enough, you
can absorb the tariffs and still compete. But if you have an absolute prohibition through a regulatory barrier, you're out of the
picture. Competition is reduced. I think that's something we
ought to worry a great deal about and learn more about.
Foreman: I ought to go back to Washington and say Murray
Weidenbaum wants to go back to Smoot-Hawley!
Weidenbaum: That's a good line!
Foreman: And I agree with him. Clearly it's being used as a
non-tariff barrier. On the other hand, we're in a new era here, and
you can't disregard the need for reasonable health and safety legislation and regulation in the United States because some other country might decide to challenge it as a non-t.ariff bar~ier.
There is an interesting piece of business going on between
the Australian government and the U.S. government over
Australia's changes in their meat inspection system. Our government instead of fighting it fiercely, is using it to help construct a ~hange that will help build the case for moderniz~ng the
U.S. inspection law. The USDA has pushed the Australians to
defend each of the changes they've made and to show they meet
the U.S.-set performance standards for reductions o~ pathoge~s
in raw meat. That, I think, is a model that we might use In
other instances. But don't hold your breath until the Europeans
decide to apply it to hormones and BST.
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Question 3: Clarence C. Barksdale, Trustee of Washington University.
I just want to make a comment and then maybe direct a question.
You gave the example of the inspection of the chickens, and Murray
talked about the banking business. I know a little bit about the
latter. In these cases I think these companies have used these as
marketing opportunities. You definitely don't want to sell a chicken
unless it's stamped "government inspected." And you definitely don't
want to be in the banking business unless it says "insured by the
FDIC"-at least I wouldn't want to be today. These are old regulations, and I think these are examples that businesses have learned
to live with them. We haven't been given the choice of living without them. I would say that the banking business would probably like
to, but with 50 or 60 years of regulation, it's hard to market in an
environment without having that stamp of approval. So I think the
biggest challenge to the problem is these newer regulations that are
coming out-how do they become more flexible? As I said, the old
regulated companies get used to it. But I think the example of the air
bag is a great one, where we see it may not be a great safety device
now-it may be a detriment. How do we get that changed?

What we need ... is not to go at this straw thing out
there, but to go at regulations individually and substantively and see if each one meets the particular needs
that it was designed to attack. Ifit doesn't, let it go.
-Foreman

go at this straw thing out there, but to go at regulations individually and substantively and see if each one meets the particular
needs that it was designed to attack. If it doesn't, let it go. I find
that every time we talk about this, there is this great Mammon
"regulation." I don't think you can sustain that argument.
Weidenbaum: Let me take a twist to that one. A number of
years ago our Center for the Study of American Business issued a
nonpartisan inventory of government regulation-just inventorying. I think it was just one page for each regulatory program. Even
though it was many years ago, that was a big fat book. I used to be
fascinated watching people turn pages on this, whether they were
workers, employers, consumers, retired people, students, faculty,
liberals, conservatives, independents-it didn't matter. They'd wind
up shaking their heads: "The Feds are regulating this?" They'd
turn some more pages: "The Feds are regulating that?" Before they'd
finish, they'd usually wind up with some comment like, "My goodness! The Feds are trying to regulate everything!"

To put it mildly, Congress has assigned more regulatory
tasks to the government than it's feasible to carry out with
any degree ofefficiency. ... You have to choose what's
really important, and Congress has never done that.
-Weidenbaum

Foreman: Let me respond quickly. Unfortunately, "flexible"
usually means that the industry has learned not only to live with
it, but has managed to turn it to its advantage through the application of the economic power that comes from lobbying and campaign
contributions. If you attack specific regulations as being poorly written or not being backed up by adequate data, I'm prepared to walk
through the process, and if the regulation doesn't measure up, let's
get rid of it. But don't attack regulation nonspecifically, as though
it were some toxic cloud. In the end, we all have regulations we
like, and we want to keep those. And we have regulations we don't
like, and we don't want to keep those.
What we need, if we want to be productive about this, is not to

I suggest it's a real eye opener to sit down and go through the
array of government regulation of business. To put it mildly, Congress has assigned more regulatory tasks to the government than
it's feasible to carry out with any degree of efficiency. It's a question of priority. You have to choose what's really important, and
Congress has never done that. They examine each regulatory statute in isolation, as if Congress and the government don't regulate
anything else. It's a way of thinking that has to be changed. But as
I say, you have to go back to the birth stage of government regulation, and that birth stage usually is, if you attend those congressional hearings, very emotional testimony on the shortcomings of
the status quo and why the government needs to intervene. And
that, unfortunately, so distorts the process that what comes out is
the nonsense I was talking about.
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Foreman: Wait a minute. If you hold a hearing because 9,000
people a year are dying from foodborne illness, and we clearly have
a system that's not attacking that adequately, that's nonsense?
Weidenbaum: The nonsense, Carol, is not the complaints
about the problem. The nonsense is the hastily written and enacted response. That's the problem. I think it's just plain wrong.
Foreman: Well, the last time they amended that law was 196 7 .
Weidenbaum: The fact that they didn't have a copy of the BOOpage Clean Air Act when they voted on it, I think it's awfulespecially when you sit down and try turning pages on that. I served
on the Clean Air Act advisory committee at the EPA for a number of
years. That was an eye opener. Look at all of the provisions of the
Clean Air Act that EPA was supposed to carry out. They couldn't.
And of course a lot of environmental organizations had a lot of fun
suing the bejesus out of EPA for not carrying out the 800 pages of
requirements when they knew when the bill was being voted on
there was no way that all of those requirements could feasibly be
carried out.
Foreman: And I would argue that that's a problem with a specific law, not a problem with regulation generically. If you end up
with a regulatory budget in which you, as you did, list all of the
regulations, and say we're going to get rid of 10 percent of them
next year, the ones that will end up staying are the ones that
everybody's most comfortable with because they've been around
the longest time. And the ones that will end up going are the ones
that address the problems that we confront today as our society
changes-the problems that come about from increasing air pollution, the problems that come about from women trying to be in the
workforce on an equal footing. And it seems to me the solution is to
write a better law, not to say we are going to deal with regulation
qua regulation and do away with it.
Weldon: Things are beginning to get exciting here! This is
getting a little bit like Crossfire now.
Foreman: Oh, no, come on! We'd never sink to that.
Weidenbaum: The regulatory budget that Carol Foreman
has just described is awful. I'd vote against it if I had the opportunity. Let me describe my version of the regulatory budgetit's very different.
The first step is to know the magnitude of resources-we do
that in dollars, typically-that is devoted to carrying out government regulation. Depending on the estimates, it's 400, 500, 600,
700 billion dollars. There are arguments for each of these numbers, but each of them is a very large number. But in the budgeting

process, the Congress at some point votes a lid-let's be generous
and say $700 billion a year for the compliance costs of government
regulation. Now that $700 billion doesn't show up in the federal
budget. It shows up initially in the budgets of the organizationswhether it's Washington University or McDonnell Douglas-that
are complying with the government regulation. But ultimately it
shows up in the prices of all the goods and services consumers buy.
How to administer that $700 billion ceiling each year? Very
simply, in concept. Each agency comes in with its regulatory programs, and sure enough, they come in with more than $700 billion. I grew up in the old budget bureau, so government budgeting
is something I do know something about. They come in predictably
with more than $700 billion of compliance costs of regulation, and
therefore, the government is forced to set priorities: Which are the
most productive, effective government regulatory programs? Let's
assure them a place in the budget, and the ones that aren't worth
it, that aren't cost effective, that would flunk the simplest benefitcost test, let's cut them back. And that $700 billion lid, or wherever
you draw the line, would force that priority process that is absent
from the regulatory regime at the present time. Will a regulatory
budget work perfectly? No, but I'm tempted to say anything would be
better than the chaotic status quo.
Foreman: What is the compliance cost for sugar price supports? If you've got that in a regulatory budget, you can bet that the
same people who have been so effective in maintaining sugar price
supports long after there was any justification for them, if there
ever was, will end up wlth their piece of a federal regulatory budget.
And changes that need to be made in worker safety and civil rights
are likely to get squeezed out because the lobby supporting them
has less money for campaign contributions.
Weidenbaum: No, Carol. There is a little problem with what
you said, and that little problem is you're describing a boondoggle
subsidy program, and subsidies by definition are in the federal budget to begin with. So there's no opportunity or need or reason for
putting them into the regulatory budget.
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Summations
Weldon: Well, I hate to interrupt, but we need to give our two
debaters some time for summations. We could go on for another
hour at least, and I know you're all enjoying it. But I also know you
probably have places that you've got to be. So at the risk of leaving
you disgruntled because I didn't allow more time for questions, I'm

going to ask Murray to go first with his summation. It sounds as
though these two debaters won't agree on anything, but I have a
feeling we will probably find some sources of agreement. Murray?
Weidenbaum: I'd like to offer four specific approaches for improving the status quo in government regulation.
1. Policy reform should start with the lightest touch-require
economic impact statements before issuing a regulation. This is a
close cousin to the existing environmental impact statements. Just
make sure that regulatory decision makers know the economic
consequences of their actions before they act. This may include
identifying and analyzing advantages and disadvantages-but does
not extend to performing a formal benefit -cost analysis.
2. The next step is to estimate the benefits and costs to see if
the benefits justify the costs (not that they necessarily have to be
greater). In that spirit, President Carter required regulatory agencies to compare costs and benefits before they issued a new regulation. President Clinton has taken the same position. However, the
Carter people took this requirement seriously. The General Accounting Office reports that most regulatory agencies ignore the
Clinton executive order.

Perhaps at times the answer is to give the private sector
the benefit ofthe doubt: if Congress can't write a sensible regulatory law, it should hold off adding to the
clutter on the statute books.
-Weidenbaum

3. An approach with more teeth is to require each new regulation to pass a formal benefit-cost test. President Reagan required
new regulations to take such a benefit-cost test, except where the
law prevented it. It turns out that the statutory exceptions are numerous. These include specific statutes such as the Clean Air Act
and the so-called independent regulatory agencies-FCC, lTC,
NRC, FERC, and NLRB. Yes, it will take a new law to remedy this
deficiency.
4. A regulatory budget is yet another way of controlling regulatory costs. This would be a ceiling on the high costs that regulators
impose on the private sector-compliance costs now run in the
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hundreds of billions of dollars a year. This is not a recipe for rigidity. New priorities could replace old within the overall budget ceiling.
Perhaps at times the answer is to give the private sector the
benefit of the doubt: if Congress can't write a sensible regulatory
law it should hold off adding to the clutter on the statute books.
Exi~ting regulatory statutes already fill up a good-sized library. Likewise, if a regulatory agency is unable to issue a work~ble regulation it should restrain its normal impulse to expand Its realm of
activity. More is not always better than less.
. .
The experience of the Interstate Commerce Commission
provides a pertinent case in point. A few years ag~, ~ongress
decided to close down this oldest of regulatory commisswns. The
demise of the ICC goes unmourned. Nobody misses it! What a
great precedent .
.
Foreman: I seem to recall that it was Jimmy Carter who first
proposed getting rid of the ICC and. I again ~ant to differentiate
between economic regulation and social regulation, because Murray
cites economic, but his goal is to go after social regulation.
Those of us who support government regulation to protect such
values as health the environment, and civil rights have an obligation to make su;e that regulation is as rational, effective, and efficient as possible and generates the fewest possible uni~tended
negative consequences. We are obliged to seek ways to Improve
both the process and the product.
.
.
I have five recommendations for improving regulatwn.
First we should join forces to insist that Congress take responsibili~y for its role in regulation. It's hard to write good regulations implementing a law that has been rendered hopelessly vague
and confused by changes made to buy a vote here or there. Co.ngress rarely sets specific time limi~s on new regulatory authonty
or establishes deadlines for regulations to be completed. Congress
rarely conducts regular and detailed oversight of regulatory age~
cies. Pushing Congress in this direction would be a worthwhile
investment of corporate influence.
Second, Congress and regulators need access to independen~,
high-quality scientific analysis. Congress h~s independe~t . au~l
tors and budget analysts, but, in a world dnven by. sophisticated
science, Congress has no capacity to an~l~ze the science underlying demands for legislative action. At a minimum, Congress should
reinstate the Office of Technology Assessment.
Regulatory agencies need more and b~tter scientists to review and evaluate industry data and some Independent rese~rch
capacity. They should not have to rely completely on data provided
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by interested parties. Instead of cutting agency budgets, regulated
industries should lobby to improve their scientific capacity.
The regulatory process would also be improved by a mechanism that outlines the most pressing scientific issues in a field
and generates an independent scientific analysis of the options for
addressing it. The Health Effects Institute set up under the Clean
Air Act has helped develop better regulation. This independent organization funded by both the auto industry and EPA used independent panels of scientists and peer reviewers to determine the key
scientific issues on the best way to deal with air pollution caused
by gasoline fumes at service stations. EPA was able to make a
decision based on scientific data that were accepted by both industry and government.
Third, I support rules that embrace regulatory performance
standards and establish financial incentives that reward positive
behavior.

Those ofus who support government regulation to
protect such values as health, the environment, and civil
rights have an obligation to make sure that regulation is
as rational, effective, and efficient as possible.
-Foreman

Fourth, I support some form of negotiated rule making that
brings the stakeholders and regulators together as early in the
process as possible and emphasizes a cooperative rather than an
adversarial procedure.
Fifth, I support risk assessment, risk analysis, economic
impact statements and regulatory impact analyses. I oppose requiring cost-benefit analysis in social regulation and establishing a regulatory budget. Cost-benefit analysis is not either
well-developed as a tool nor particularly useful in analyzing human and aesthetic factors.
Finally, in a recent study, Professor Weidenbaum referred to
the lack of trust that hampers rational decision making. I agree with
him. Effective representative government requires a modicum of trust
among the participants. Without it, the best data are useless. It is
unlikely that we'll see any improvement in substance or process until
we restore some level of trust and civility to the dialogue.
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Weldon: Thank you to both of our debaters for a very interesting afternoon. I think we can find some points of agreement. They
may beat me up afterwards if I say they've agreed on something
and they haven't, but we are very civil here.
I think there's a possibility that Carol might agree with Murray
on starting with a light touch by requiring economic impact statements at least, without a formal cost-benefit analysis. There is no
doubt about the fact that Carol opposes a regulatory budget and
Murray is for it. However, I think they both would agree that it's
critically important that Congress be persuaded to write better laws
and exercise more discipline as it writes the laws. I think that both
of them would cite the OSHA law as one that basically says ''We can't
figure this out. Let the regulators do it." And that's what happened ..
I think probably that Murray would agree that a sunset proVIsion on regulatory laws would be a good idea. It would be a way of
weeding out some that didn't work-the air bag example, for instance. I think when that regulation was put in place, everyone
thought it was great. No one realized that there might be some
potential injuries that might result.
Carol has indicated a need for a better science base, and I
think Murray would definitely agree with that, although I'm .not
sure he would feel that the agencies need more staff. He m1ght
suggest that the agencies find ways to increas~ ~heir staff of science-based regulators by eliminating other pos1t1ons.
Certainly I think that as we move into a more technological
world, a complex world of biology and genomics, for examp~e, there
is going to be unlimited demand from t~e peopl~ and t~e1r representatives in Washington to write legislat10n that 1ncreas1ngly rules
how we will live our lives. And I'm thinking in particular about the
debate on the ethics of stem-cell development that may result in
the growth of replacement organs as just one example.
.
I think that Murray and Carol would also agree that there 1s a
lack of trust and that something needs to be done to build that
trust. We've shown a good example of trust-building this afternoon:
two very intelligent people who come from different parts of t?e
political spectrum have come together, have had a reasona~le dlscussion and have entertained you all for an hour and 15 m1nutes.
1 hope ;ou've enjoyed this debate. Thank you all for coming.
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